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1Was Land Reform Necessary?
Access to Land in Spain, 1860 to 1931
1. Introduction
There are two views of land reforms in the literature today.1 Advocates of government-
initiated land redistribution argue that the operation of land markets in developing countries,
including both land sales and tenancy markets, is conducive neither to social equity nor economic
efficiency. Cultivation rights and the concentration of land tenure observed historically across
countries are an outcome of power relationships. Powerful landowners employed their capacity
to coerce and distort markets to extract economic rents from tenants, peasants and laborers, and
land sales transactions tended to exacerbate inequality and rural poverty by making it possible to
concentrate land tenure in the hands of a few wealthy landowners (Deininger, 2003). In their
view, given the failure of land market to reduce the skewed land distribution, a land reform that
redistributes the land from landowners out to small farmers in small plots would lead to an
increase in overall production and welfare (Binswanger et al., 1995). However, an increasing
literature is skeptical about the advantages of this kind of redistributive intervention because it
exacerbated social conflict and generally failed to improve land use efficiency and social equity
(De Janvry et al., 2001; Otsuka, 2007).2 For this reason, many policymakers and academics
promote market-oriented reforms,3 expecting that well-functioning land markets would generate
a “spontaneous” redistribution of land from inefficient to efficient producers.
These two alternative views about land reform also have contradictory views on the scope
of land redistribution. For those favoring government-initiated land reform, the final objective of
any land reform should be the creation of an agrarian landscape of small and medium-scale
farms. As much as possible, these farms should be family-owned, self-sufficient and independent
from labor markets. Instead, advocates of market-oriented reforms have as an objective that
1 There are numerous surveys available. See the updated reviews of Deininger (2003) and Otsuka (2007).
2 Several empirical studies comparing the effect of land redistribution and land sales showed that the
operation of markets had been superior to land reform policies in several developing countries. See, for
example, Barham et al. (1995) on Guatemala; Deininger et al. (2004) on Colombia; and Deininger et al.
(2007) on India.
3 Market-oriented reforms include, among others, measures on the definition of property rights, the
elimination of restrictions to the free operation of factor markets, and the development of credit markets
for small peasants.
2agrarian workers should have access to land ownership without abandoning the labor markets.
From their point of view, the possession of any landholding, regardless of size, offers great
benefits to peasants because land can be used as credit collateral and act as insurance during
downturns. Furthermore, they consider that the allocation of time between self-cultivation and
labor market participation is spontaneously and efficiently produced by the action of free rural
factor markets.
We believe that the Spanish historical experience could be very illuminating for the
current and the historical debate because Spain tried to implement both types of reforms. The
Spanish countryside experienced a classical “market-oriented” land reform during the last
decades of the 18 th century and the first half of the 19 th century, the so-called Liberal Reform.
This reform secured property rights, enhanced the operation of factor markets and increased the
amount of land in the market. However, during the early decades of the 20th century,4 the
opportunity for a government-initiated land reform with the objective of redistributing land
ownership from large landowners to the hands of poor peasants became a major issue in the
political scene. This new land reform was approved during the Second Republic (1936), but it
was never fully implemented due to the Civil War.
The main question we discuss in this article is whether this government-initiated reform
was necessary in Spain because land markets were inefficient in reallocating land to landless
workers. The debate over the opportunity in this land reform has been hampered by the absence
of quantitative information on access to land in Spain. In this sense, our paper offers the first
quantitative evidence on the amount and regional distribution of landless peasants and the causes
of their reduction from 1860 to 1930. We show that the amount of landless workers decreased
from about two million people in 1860 to about one million people in 1930. At the same time,
the number of land tenants and owners remained quite stable at about two-and-a-half million
people over the entire period. However, the intensity of this dramatic transformation varied from
period to period and from region to region. The balance between landless peasants and people
with land access (proprietors and tenants) changed slightly from 1860 to 1890. In other words,
the liberal land reform did not produce a massive process of land redistribution. In sharp
contrast, the situation changed substantially over the next forty years, from 1890 to 1930, given
that the quantity of people with access to land remained stable, while the amount of landless
peasants practically halved. In southern Spanish provinces (below the Madrid parallel), the
4 The classical account of these agrarian changes during that period is Simpson (1995). See the recent
revision of Clar and Pinilla (2008).
3increase in peasants with land access arrived later and amounted to less than in the northern part
of Spain but was also very significant.
What could account for this dramatic change in the Spanish countryside? This process of
change was not driven by any government-initiated land redistribution but by the initiative of the
markets. Specifically, we argue that two interrelated market forces caused this impressive
transformation. On the one hand, structural change favoring industry and services, urban growth,
and foreign and home migrations drained the rural population. On the other hand, the decrease
in relative land prices and the action of free land market forces5 eased the access of landless
peasants to property and avoided concentrating land in a few hands. In other words, the ratio
between rural wages and land prices was increasing in Spain, particularly in the most dynamic
regions. Our new evidence indicates that access to land for landless rural workers was improving,
as was their standard-of-living, during the first decades of the 20th century. It should be
emphasized that, without an efficient and active land market, it is likely that the concentration of
land ownership increased as a consequence of countryside migrations and the subsequent
decrease in the agrarian workforce.
The remainder of the paper is organized as following. In the following Section, we
present historical background on land reforms in Europe and Spain. Section 3 presents a
straightforward supply-and-demand framework for understanding and analyzing land reforms.
Section 4 presents data on the relative evolution of factor prices. Section 5 offers new evidence
on the amount of landowners, tenants and landless workers. The following two Sections consider
the causes of these changes. Section 6 discusses the importance of structural change for access to
land, and the next Section analyses the role of land markets. The last Section concludes and
discusses several avenues for further research.
2. Historical background of Land Reforms in Europe and Spain
European historical experience during the late decades of the 19th century and the first
decades of the 20th century seems to give certain support to the idea that the free and efficient
operation of land markets could improve significantly the position of landless peasants and
5 Carmona and Rosés (2009) have already shown that land sales and prices responded quickly to market
stimulus and that Spanish land prices were driven by fundamentals. They conclude that land markets were
efficient and competitive. According to a substantial literature (e.g. Otsuka, 2007), in competitive markets,
land is allocated to the most efficient users, making land reforms unnecessary and detrimental for overall
welfare. Thus, from the economic efficiency point-of-view, a land reform redistributing land to poor
peasants was neither necessary nor efficient.
4generate a ‘spontaneous’ (market-based) land reform. After 1873, the relative importance of
larger holdings decreased while different forms of direct cultivation gained momentum in the
majority of Western European Countries (Koning, 1994: 80). In spite of the new legislation in
favor of small farms, the market was the main force behind the decrease in the relative
importance of larger estates in France, Germany and the Netherlands (Koning, 1994: 88). Large
landholders started to sell their estates between 1875 and 1895 (Swinnen, 2001). After the World
War I, using the extraordinary war benefits, land sales even increased (Auge Laribe, 1923;
Swinnen, 2001). In Germany, the expansion of credit led to an increase in the amount and
relative importance of small family farms (Souchon, 1899, 132). In England, despite the problems
of getting an accurate measure, the relative importance of large holdings decreased by one fifth
(Federico, 2005) as a result of market forces (Dovring, 1965: 123). In many regions of France and
Belgium, with no mechanization and population growth, the marked rise of the small family
farms provoked that large scale farming, based on wage work, gradually disappeared from the
agricultural scene (Van Zanden 1991: 216). Similarly, in Eastern Europe, the dismantling of large
farms, to a considerable extent, happened spontaneously and independently of any measure of
land reform. In Russia and Poland, many of the large estates were crumbling due to the economic
difficulties of the estate owners. The same process also applied, at a slower tempo, to the Eastern
German Junker estates, despite their politically favorable situation (Dovring, 1965: 122).
In Spain, the main objective of the Liberal Reform was to secure property rights and to
eliminate the restrictions for the free operation of good and factor markets; therefore, it can be
considered as a prototypical market-oriented reform of the 19th century.6 Authorities derogated
the legal apparatus of the Old Regime. Feudal rights were eliminated, together with the
restrictions for land sales, grain commerce and labor contracts. Many of the old forms of land
tenancy that complicated the definition of property-rights were simply abolished and was
established the private property of land. Furthermore, to alleviate their budget problems and to
finance wars and infrastructures, successive governments put into the market the properties of
the Church, the municipalities and the communal lands, which were sold in auction. According to
a substantial literature, all these measures resulted in a moderate expansion of agrarian production
but did not redistribute land in hands of landless peasants.7 Like in other European countries
6 See, for example, García Sanz (1985) and Peset (1992).
7 This absence of land redistribution was interpreted negatively by the literature. See, among others,
Carrión (1975), Costa (1911-1912), Fontana (1985), Garrabou (1999), Nadal (1975), Pérez Picazo (1990),
Robledo (1993), Ruíz Torres (1994) and Villares (1997). For a revision of this interpretation see Carmona
and Simpson (2003).
5(Koning, 1994: 63), it seems that the privatization of communal lands facilitated an increase in
average landholding size and the concentration of land in hands of richer peasants (García Perez,
1993: 105-173).
As mentioned earlier, during the early decades of the 20th century, the opportunity for
government-initiated land reform appeared as a matter of debate in Spain. This interventionist
policy was justified for reasons of economic efficiency, social equity and the distribution of
political power. Implicitly, reformers believed that land sales markets failed miserably and that the
unmitigated operation of agrarian factor markets would generate persistent equity problems.
Several contemporaries claimed that the large southern estates had diseconomies of scale and that
substantial efficiency gains could be raised by transforming them into small landholdings, where
extensive production could be replaced by intensive farming.8 It was also argued that rural
workers were not rewarded for their work and were underemployed and that landlords obliged
their tenants to pay abusive rents. According to the most notable reformer of the period, Pascual
Carrion, the absence of small and medium farms in southern Spain left peasants in the hands of
landowners who got higher rents due to their monopolistic power and the widespread hunger for
land.9 Finally, politicians believed that large landlords, particularly the members of the nobility,
took advantage of their economic power, which was directly generated by their ownership of
large estates, to coerce rural electors and to get seats in the parliament.
In the end, several reforms affecting land ownership were approved with the support of a
large part of the parliament during the Second Republic (1931-1939).10 This reform, never fully
implemented, consisted of four major measures: (1) Landowners were prevented from taking
land from peasants at the end of their cultivation contracts; (2) the agrarian work day was limited
to eight hours, which was already in force for industrial workers; (3) landowners were forced to
exclusively hire laborers who lived at the municipality where the farm was located;11 and (4) under
threat of confiscation, owners were required to put all available land into cultivation. It can be
8 Pérez Ledesma (1977: 256-59), Robledo Hernández (1993: 110-115).
9 Carrión (1932).
10 The reference to the Republican land reform is still the classical work of Malefakis (1970). See also
Robledo (1993)(1996).
11 However, this measure had contradictory consequences on the welfare of landless peasants. It increased
the bargaining power of insiders but damaged the position of journeymen who travelled from place-to-
place looking for a job. Furthermore, it could have very negative consequences for agricultural production
in Southern Spain, where the seasonality of the work was very marked. See Simpson (1992) and Silvestre
(2007).
6easily seen that all of these reforms sought to increase the bargaining power of small tenants and
journeymen with landowners.
3. A straightforward framework for understanding land reforms
Before we proceed with our empirical analysis, it would be useful to have a
straightforward model for understanding whether land reforms are necessary for land
redistribution. Put simply, the social objective is the reduction in the amount of landless workers
and a simultaneous relative increase in landowners and tenants. If markets fail in achieving this
goal, a government-initiated land reform appears to be justified. To conduct our theoretical
argumentation, we employ a perfect competition model of rural labor markets and a similar
model of agrarian land markets. Our choice is for these two models of perfect competition,
instead of models of dual markets or imperfect competition, because previous research on the
period tends to underline the competitive nature of labor and land rural markets.12
[FIGURE 1]
[FIGURE 2]
The effects of demand and supply shifts in agrarian labor markets are portrayed in Figure
1. On the x-axis of Figure 1, we present the relative quantities (measured in hours or full time
equivalent male workers) of the self-employed (owners and tenants) and journeymen (QLSE/QLJ),
while on the y-axis, we present the relative income of the two groups (VA/W). Note that the
income of the owner-cultivators is equal to value added (rents and wages) per hectare, VA, while
salaried workers only get wages, W. In the case of tenant-cultivators, they should share land rent
with owners, but one could confidentially assume than their income is, if anything, equal or
higher than the opportunity cost of salaried labor, W. Figure 2 presents land markets (as usual,
quantities of land (QuantityLN) on the x-axis and land relative prices (PriceLN/W) on the y-axis)
under the common assumption that land supply (S) is inelastic. Labor and land markets are
related through rents. Increases (decreases) in rents are translated into land price increases
(decreases).13
12 See, on labor markets, Rosés and Sánchez-Alonso (2004), and on land markets, Carmona and Rosés
(2009).
13 Rosés and Carmona (2009) demonstrated econometrically this relation between land prices and rents in
Spain.
7There are several forces that could produce (relative) demand shifts in rural labor
markets. For example, if owners and tenant-cultivators become more efficient than estates
employing salaried labor as a result of technological change (or better organization),14 we should
observe a rightward demand shift (D’). This shift increases both the relative quantity of the self-
employed and their relative remuneration (equilibrium in point 1). However, this produces an
undesirable effect because it makes it more difficult for landless workers to buy or rent land.
Land is more desirable, which produces an increase in land demand (in Figure 2, equilibrium is
displaced to point a). At this point, the only policy solution for easing land access is a
government-initiated land reform. A leftward demand shift (D’’) reduces both the relative
quantity of the self-employed and their relative remuneration (equilibrium in point 2). Again, the
action of markets did not generate land redistribution.
Relative supply shifts could be a consequence of migrations across provinces and
industries, demographic change and reallocation of workers from salaried to self-employed. If
owners-cultivators and tenants tend to migrate, or reallocate across sectors, more than salaried
workers do, supply curve moves upward (S’’).15 As a result, the relative income of the self-
employed increases, while their relative amount decreases (equilibrium in point 4). In accordance,
relative land prices increase, and land demand displaces upward (in Figure 2, equilibrium in a).
The objective of spontaneous land redistribution fails, and policy intervention appears justified.
Finally, when the relative amount of self-employed workers increases, the supply curve
moves downward (S’), and their relative income decreases (equilibrium in point 3). This outcome
could be the result of either higher migration (reallocation) rates of landless workers or a
reallocation of workers from salaried to self-employed. Note that, if land markets were not
competitive, the remaining owners and tenants, who supposedly had control over market
outcomes, could appropriate the land of owners and tenants who left agriculture and maintain
their relative incomes. Moreover, this social-improving outcome should be accompanied by a
contraction of land demand and a subsequent decrease in relative land prices (in Figure 2,
equilibrium in b). Obviously, the equilibrium in point 3 makes government intervention in land
markets unnecessary.
14 Literature supportive of government-initiated land reforms (e.g., Binswanger et al., 1995) argues that
holdings of owners-cultivators are more efficient than estates that hire work.
15 Sánchez-Alonso (1995) found that international migration is higher in provinces where owners and
tenants were relatively more abundant. Instead, Silvestre (2005) found no significant relation for home
migrations.
8Following this straightforward model, we conclude that land reform is unnecessary only if
the relative amount of landless workers decreases and relative wages grow. Additionally, the
relative land prices should decrease. If any of these conditions are not fulfilled, land reforms, with
the social optimal objective to redistribute land to landless workers, are justified.
4. The evolution of relative factor prices
According to the intuitions of the model in the previous Section, we now consider the
evolution of relative factor prices. Information on relative factor prices is only available for the
first third of the 20th century (from 1908 to 1931); in consequence, we had to exclude from our
analysis the second half of the 19th century. In any case, the Republican project of land reform
was justified by the Spanish experience during the first decades of the 20th century.
[FIGURE 3]
Figure 3 presents the evolution of the ratio between value added per hectare and male
agrarian wages in Spain. At first glance, one could observe the existence of up to four different
periods: an initial period of price stability; a rapid increase in relative prices during the first years
of the Word War I; relative prices plummeting from 1917 to 1921; and, in the remaining decade,
relative prices remaining comparatively low. Overall, the relative prices at the end of the period
were considerably lower than during the first years. If one considers regional differences, the
major decreases took place in the Ebro Valley, southern Castile and Andalusia (although it
affected all regions).
[FIGURE 4]
As we pointed out in Section 3, if land markets worked smoothly, when the ratio VA/W
decreases, the relative land prices (PriceLN/W) should also decrease. Figure 4 confirms this point.
Relative land prices decreased significantly over the period in an order of magnitude similar to
the ratio between value added per hectare and wages. However, the pattern of relative wage gains
is even clearer in this instance. Relative land prices declined steadily from 1908 to 1922, and
despite temporal upsurges, their levels were well below the initial levels up to the end of the
series. All regions, except the North, shared this declining tendency.
It should be noted that the behavior of relative factor prices presented in this Section is
only possible in two labor market situations (see Figure 1): when relative demand for self-
9employed agricultural workers moves downward or, alternatively, when their relative supply
moves upward. To discriminate between these two possibilities, we now consider the relative
quantities of owners, tenants and landless agrarian workers.
5. Measuring owners, tenants and landless workers
Spanish historical sources do not offer unequivocal information about the changes in the
amount of land ownership in Spain over the second half of the 19th century and the early decades
of the 20th century. For instance, the population censuses did not consistently record the amount
of landowners. In consequence, we have inferred, employing different historical sources, the
amount of landowners, tenants, and landless workers (see Appendix 1). The main results of our
calculations are presented in the following table 1.
[TABLE 1]
Table 1 shows information on the amount of landless workers, landowners and tenants
from 1860 to 1930. The number of agrarian workers with access to land (owners and tenants)
collected in table 1, panel A, remained apparently stable in Spain from 1860 to 1930. This broad
impression masks important regional and temporal differences. From 1860 to 1890, their amount
increased slightly in all regions, except in northern Castile, where it grew by about one-fourth. In
consequence, the liberal land reform increased, to some extent, the number of landowners and
eased the access to land for landless peasants but did not dramatically change the ownership
structure of the Spanish countryside. 16 In the following period (1890-1910), this trend continued,
except in northern Castile, and the amount of farmers with access to land decreased by less than
five percent.17 In the last period (1910-1930), the amount of owners and tenants decreased in all
regions except Andalusia, where it grew by about 14 percent.
The relatively stable situation presented in the paragraph above, which emerges from the
casual observation of the amount of agricultural workers with land access, can be qualified when
one takes into account the amount of landless workers (panel B) and the relative balance between
agricultural workers with land access and landless workers. The amount of landless workers
16 This is also the prevalent view in the qualitative historiography. See, for example, García Sanz (1985)
and Peset (1992).
17 During this period, agriculture in Northern Castile experienced a severe crisis due to the grain invasion
of the late 19th century and the philoxera epidemic, which damaged severely its vineyards. See, García
Orallo (2008).
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decreased significantly from 1860 to 1930. Figures were stable from 1860 to 1890 but decreased
by half million in each of the two subsequent periods (1890-1910 and 1910-1930).18 In other
words, the number of landless workers halved during these seventy years (from about two million
to less than one million people). This dramatic change is even more evident in relative terms: the
relative amount of landless workers plummeted from about 46 percent of the male agrarian
workforce in 1860 to 28 percent in 1930. All in all, if we employ the intuitions of the model
outlined in Section 3, land reform had little justification in the 1920s. The relative quantity of
workers with access to land increased, and relative prices decreased (Figure 1, equilibrium 3); that
is, the supply curve of self-employed workers moved to the right.
The overall picture for Spain masks important regional differences, particularly in the
timing of the overall trend towards a reduction in landless workers. More specifically, in
Andalusia, the relative amount of landless workers remained stable from 1860 to 1910 and only
decreased in the next twenty years, from 1910 to 1930. Within Andalusia, differences between
western (Cadiz, Cordoba, Huelva and Seville) and eastern (Almeria, Granada, Jaen and Malaga)
provinces were also significantly large. While eastern Andalusia replicated Spanish trends toward
landless worker reduction, western Andalusia remained as the region with more landless workers
in absolute and relative terms over the entire period. The fact is that the total amount of landless
workers grew, while their percentage remained stable. Additionally, no Spanish province reached
Cadiz levels, where two-thirds of the agrarian workforce consisted of agrarian workers without
land as late as 1930. In the Ebro Valley and Mediterranean region, a decrease in landless workers
had been continuous since the mid-19th century. In the North, this process took place in the forty
years from 1890 to 1930. In northern Castile, all reduction took place over the first thirty years,
while the relative Figures remained stable from 1890 to 1930. In southern Castile, the relative
amount of landless workers remained unchanged over the entire period.
Our new evidence also shows that Spain was not a country of landless workers. More
prominently, they were not the majority of agrarian workforce in any of its regions. Additionally,
the Spanish situation was not extraordinary in European terms. If we compare Spain with France,
one could observe that the relative amount of landless workers was practically identical by the
1920s (about 28 percent in Spain with about 27 percent in France). More surprisingly, French
relative Figures remained stable since the mid-19th century,19 while in Spain, the relative amount
of landless workers showed a notable reduction since the end of the 19 th century. In Germany,
18 During, these years demographic growth was intense in Spain, despite large migrations. The population
grew from about 17.5 million in 1890 to 23.5 million in 1930.
19 French Figures are drawn from Sicsic (1992) and from the French Statistical yearbook for 1929.
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the relative amount of landless workers was higher than in Spain and remained practically
unchanged over the period. In 1882, about 51 percent of the agricultural workforce had no access
to land. Fifty years later (1933), the relative Figure was practically identical; that is, more than half
of agrarian workforce had no access to land.20
6. Structural change and access to land
The changes in the relative amount of landless workers in Spain may be the result of
either shifts in the provincial distribution of agrarian employment (between provinces effect) or the
changes within provinces in the balance between people with and without access to land. The
between provinces effect could be attributed to broad changes in agrarian trade favoring provinces
abundant, or not abundant, in landless workers and the subsequent reallocation of labor across
provinces.21 Instead, the within effect is related to (negative) shifts in the relative supply of landless
workers.22 Note that the presence of between effects could indicate that a genuine reallocation of
land between workers with and without land access did not take place.
To disentangle these between and within effects, we employ a modified version of the standard
approach in the labor economics literature (Berman et al. 1994). Therefore, the change in the
share of landless workers in total agrarian employment is broken down into the change in the
distribution of employment that occurs within provinces and the change in the distribution of
employment that happens between provinces.
(1)
for i = 1...., n provinces are being considered. PLJi = QLJi/QLi is the proportion of landless
workers in province i, S i = QLi/QL, is the share of agrarian employment in province i. The first
term on the right represents the change in the aggregate share of landless workers caused by
shifts in the distribution of agrarian employment between provinces with different shares of
20 German Figures are drawn from German Population Censuses.
21 For example, if international trade favored the exports of farm intensive products like milk and cheese,
the employment in provinces specialized in those products increased relatively to employment in the
remaining provinces. Given that these productions were prototypical of regions where owners were
abundant, the relative amount of owners in Spain necessarily increased.
22 Following the intuitions of the model developed in Section 3, evidence on the relative amount of
landless workers of Section 5, and the price evidence of Section 4, we consider that demand shifts played a
negligible role in explaining within effect.
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landless workers. The second term displays the modifications in the aggregate share caused by
shifts in the proportion of landless workers within each province. The line over the variable
denotes the average value for the study period.
[TABLE 2]
The shift-share analysis shows that between 1860 and 1930, the decrease in the relative
share of landless workers had been of 0.25 percentage points per year. While changes in the
composition of labor that happened within provinces accounted for a decrease of about 0.26
percentage points per year, shifts between provinces were in the opposite direction and only
accounted for a mere increase in 0.003 percentage points per year (Table 2). Therefore, it seems
that changes in the relative composition of agrarian labor were common across provinces.
Additionally, we observe that, although in the three sub-periods considered the lion’s share of the
decreases were attributable to the within factor, the trends of the two factors were in opposite
directions in the initial (1860-90) and final sub-periods (1910-30). In any case, it was during the
intermediate sub-period (1890-1910) that the decrease was more intense, 0.43 percentage points
per year, of which 0.42 points were attributable to the within effect. In sum, overall structural
change favoring certain provinces, which were scarce in landless peasants, did not explain the
reduction in the amount of landless workers.
We pursued our investigation a bit further. For this reason, we classified the within factor
by region. With this exercise, we consider if this reduction in landless workers was particular to
certain regions (and relatively scarce in the rest). Interestingly, considering the overall period
(1860-1930), all regions had negative values. Nevertheless, about half of the total decrease in the
within factor (0.12 points per year) is attributable to provinces composing the northern region.
Instead, the contribution to that decrease of regions where the share of landless workers was
larger, Andalusia and southern Castile, was small, in total only about 0.026 percentage points. The
contribution of each region to the within factor also varied from period to period. In the initial
period, northern Castile accounted for more than half of the decrease in landless workers, while
the share of landless workers increased in the North region. In the following period (1890-1910),
practically all of the substantial decrease in landless workers occurred in the North (0.41 of 0.43
percentage points), while instead, their share grew in Andalusia and northern and southern
Castile. Finally, in the last period (1910-1930), the reductions in the share of landless workers
occurred simultaneously in all regions, although they were more substantial in the North,
Andalusia, and southern Castile (in the range of 0.08 percentage points per year).
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Finally, we produce a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the “net” amount of workers
who make a transition from landless to owners and tenants. Under the assumption that the
propensity to leave agriculture is identical across people with and without access to land, we
could estimate the “net” movement of peasant from landless to owners and tenants between T
and T-1 as:
(2)
θ= QLSE/QL is the proportion of people with land access over agrarian employment. The first
term on the right is the observed quantity of workers with land access, and the second term is the
expected change in the quantity of workers with land access if the proportion of people with and
without land access does not vary from one period to the following. This estimation is, if
anything, a lower bound of the total amount of landless workers who get land because we
assume, implicitly, that no self-cultivator finished as landless worker or died during the period
considered. Additionally, if we consider that migration rates tend to be higher among owners and
tenants, the net reallocation rates should necessarily be higher than the estimated.
[TABLE 3]
Our analysis, based on equation (2) and presented in table 3, shows that about one-third
of landless workers got access to land between 1860 and 1930; in other words, the relative
increase in owners and tenants could not be fully attributed to the movement of labor from
agriculture to other economic sectors. More prominently, it seems that land transactions were
necessarily relevant during the process of labor reallocation. In all Spanish macro-regions, except
for southern Castile, a significant amount of landless peasants reallocated to self-employed
cultivators. As in the case of structural change, differences across regions and periods were
noteworthy. In the first period, net reallocation was less profound than in the following periods,
although it was particularly noticeable in northern Castile, where about 40 percent of landless
peasants got access to land. It was during the intermediate period, from 1890 to 1910, when net
reallocation was the most intense. However, this process was only located in half of the country,
particularly in the North. In the last period (1910-1930), the relative Figures of net reallocation
were similar to the intermediate period, but the process was shared by all macro-regions. For
example, in Andalusia, more than 68,000 peasants (about the 16 percent of landless peasants) got
access to land.
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7. Market access to land
In this Section, we explore whether landless workers had the possibility of buying land in
the market. To put it simply, the probability of access to land depends on two basic factors:
workers’ earnings and the price of land. In absence of external credit, any increase in the ratio
between wages and land prices would make access to land easier, and the contrary also holds.23 In
Section 4, we have already shown that this ratio grew, and hence, access to land improved for
landless workers. However, if the initial relative price level is too high, any improvement in
relative prices may have no effect on the ability of the landless peasants to get access to land.
[TABLE 4]
Table 4 collects several alternative measures of land access for Spain and its macro-
regions. The first and second columns display, respectively, the average price of land per plot and
per hectare. From these Figures, it is easy to observe substantial differences across Spanish
regions. On average, the most expensive plots were located in Andalusia (with an average price
that was about four times those prevalent in the cheapest region, northern Castile). Considering,
instead, the price per hectare, the most expensive were the northern and Mediterranean regions,
while the cheapest were the southern Castile and Andalusia. The price per hectare seems
inversely correlated with the size of farms (that is, larger farms had lower prices per hectare).
The following two columns of table 4 (columns 3 and 4) present, respectively, the total
amount of male working days necessary to buy an average plot in different Spanish regions and
the same relation, but for hectare. In Andalusia, workers needed more than 800 days of work to
pay for the average plot, while in the Ebro Valley, this Figure decreases to only 249 days.
However, many small plots were available in all Spanish regions,24 so it is likely that a more
efficient measure of access to land in different regions is the amount of working days necessary
to acquire one hectare of land. With this measure, the region where workers had to work more
days to pay for one hectare of land is the northern region, while access to land was cheaper in
Andalusia, which is the region that drew the attention of the same reformers.
23 Grantham (1989) does not measure this hypothesis directly but suggests the same for France in 1850.
24 We have tested if plot size was inversely correlated with average land price (that is, if small plots were
more expensive than the larger ones) by regressing average land prize in average size of plots by province.
However, regressions showed that the effect of plot size in prices is insignificant. Small plots were not
relatively more expensive than the larger ones.
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Finally, columns 5 and 6 show, respectively, the number of years of family income that a
“typical” family needs to buy the average plot in different Spanish regions and the same relation
to buy one hectare. More specifically, we compute the annual family income by assuming that
males worked 200 days per year and the females 100 days and that they had two children who
worked 50 days/year each.25 As in the previous columns 3 and 4, if we use average plot in the
calculations, the region where access to land was more difficult is Andalusia, with a Figure close
to three calendar years. In northern Castile, less than one year was needed. Instead, if one
considers the years necessary to buy one hectare, we observe again that the North is the most
expensive region with a Figure close to three years, while in Andalusia, the Figure decreases to
only half a year. In any case, it seems that in all Spanish regions, access to land was not too
difficult. For example, these Figures were well below the price-to-income ratio (the ratio of
median house prices to median familial disposable incomes) in the last decades in Spain, which
moved from a minimum of 2.8 to a maximum of 5.5 (Kim and Renaud, 2009: 16).
[FIGURES 5, 6 and 7]
Now, we will consider the dynamics of access to land. In Figures 5, 6 and 7, we analyze
the evolution of our first land access measure, namely, the amount of male working days
necessary to buy the average plot.26 If we consider its overall evolution, this land market access
measure improved dramatically from 1908 to 1923, when it practically halved. During the
remaining years of our series, this tendency reversed but never came back to the initial levels.
However, a detailed inspection of the Figures 6 and 7 shows, again, the enormous differences
among the different Spanish regions. In the Ebro Valley, the North and northern Castile, this
indicator does not show a clear declining trend. For instance, in the North, a short period of
rapid improvement in market access conditions was followed by periods of increasingly harder
conditions for accessing land. In sharp contrast, in Andalusia, the Mediterranean and southern
Castile, the access to land improved largely.
[FIGURE 8]
25 It should be noted that these Figures are probably a lower bound of the total amount of family working
days and that the amount of working days in the Spanish countryside grew over the period. See Prados
and Rosés (2009) for a discussion on the amount of workings days in Spanish agriculture.
26 It should be noted that the evolution of the land access measure that employs hectares instead of
average plots mimics this Figure, though it differs in levels.
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Figure 8 analyzes the evolution of our second land access measure, namely, the number
of years of family income necessary to buy the average plot. We employ the same definition of
family income than in previous table 4. The evolution mimics those of Figure 5, that is, the
amount of income practically halved from 1908 to 1923. In 1908, the mean family spent about
two-years-and-a-half of income to buy an average plot, while in 1923, this Figure was close to
one-year-and-a-half. On closer look, one could observe that this result is mainly driven by the
evolution of male wages, which constitutes the main source of family income, while the evolution
of female and children agrarian wages is much less favorable, but they also improved their
relative income in comparison with landowners.27
Finally, we will consider the cost of leaving the market for a rural family (again, we
employ the definition of family income employed in previous table 4). We depart from the
following identity:
(3)
To exit the market, a family must obtain from its farm at least the same income as wages
that it would get from the labor market. This equality also determines the amount of land that
they should buy on the market. Solving equation (3), in equilibrium
(4)
Given that the numerator of land productivity is the share of labor in value added (wages
x hours worked) plus the share of land (rents x hours worked), we could further simplify the
expression (4), then:
(5)
[TABLE 5]
27 To save space, we skip similar analysis for each of the six Spanish macro-regions (regional Figures are
available upon request from the authors). It should be noted, however, that regional evolution of this
measure of access to land mimics those presented in Figures 6 and 7. Therefore, the relative situations of
landless workers improved more in Andalusia, the Mediterranean and Southern Castile than in Ebro
Valley, the North and Northern Castile.
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The results of all of these calculations are quite surprising (see table 5). On average,
Spanish rural families only need less than two years to get the land necessary to leave the labor
market. Additionally, this amount was quite stable over the period considered here. The regions
where this possibility was easier were southern Castile (1.25 years) and Andalusia (1.3 years),
while it was more difficult in the North (3.53 years). Surprisingly, these results contradict the
geography of land ownership in Spain: self-cultivators were relatively scarcer in regions where
abandoning the rural labor market was easier, while the contrary also holds.
8. Conclusions and further research
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, the amount of landless workers
decreased dramatically during the period considered. In absolute terms, it decreased from about
two million people in 1860 to about one million people in 1930. Accordingly, the share of male
workers with access to land grew from about 54 percent in 1860 to about 72 percent in 1930.
Second, structural change, particularly the reallocation of labor from agriculture to industry and
services, played a central role in this process, but the role of land markets was not negligible.
About one-third of landless workers got access to land by means of land transactions between
1860 and 1930. Third, we point out that market forces were improving the situation of agrarian
workers and their possibility of acquiring land without any particular policy. The ratio between
land prices and wages in Spain decreased by twenty percent. More prominently, different
measures of land affordability showed that landless workers increased their land access over the
period and that getting land was not very difficult. In consequence, apparently, the Republican
land reform was not necessary for transforming the ownership structure of Spanish agriculture.
These results open many avenues for further research. The first question is why
Republican governments were so interested in implementing land reform when it had little
justification. Our intuition is that political issues were a major player in this economic policy. The
second major issue is what role was played by financial markets in land acquisition over the
period. This period witnessed a major transformation of Spanish banking with a rapid increase in
financial intermediation, but the countryside did not take part in this process. Finally, the amount
of income that rural families had to save for leaving the market was quite affordable. Therefore, it
seems that the same rural families decided to remain in the labor market and to not become
owner-cultivators. What was the reason for this decision?
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Appendix 1. Estimating the amount of landless workers
We have information on the total amount of landless workers (peasants) for the year 1933
(from the peasants’ survey conducted by the Republican authorities); the amount in the
agricultural workforce for the years 1860, 1887, 1910, and 1930 (from the population censuses);28
and the amount of taxpayers on land for the years 1855, 1890-91, 1907 and 1930 (from the land
taxes yearbook).
Our estimation procedure is the following. First, given that the census of peasants does
not cover all judicial districts in all provinces, we infer the total amount of peasants in each
province by extrapolating information from the available villages to the rest of villages in the
same district. This process allows us to obtain the quantity of peasants for all provinces in 1933
except the Basque Country and Navarre (which we exclude from our calculations). It should be
noted that these surveys exhaustively covered those provinces where landless peasants were more
abundant and, if anything, exaggerates the amount of landless workers.29 Second, we obtain the
amount of owners and tenants in 1930 by deducting from the total amount of workforce in
agriculture the (estimated) amount of landless workers. Third, we compute the ratio between the
(estimated) amount of owners and tenants and the (observed) amount of taxpayers in the year
1930.30 With this last procedure, we correct the fact that, in provinces with smaller plots and
many municipalities, land owners and tenants could have more than one plot in different
municipalities and, hence, could be counted several times in taxpayer statistics.31 Then, we
28 Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2010) discusses the quality of this source.
29 Espinoza et al. (2007) discusses the quality and exactitude of the survey, arriving at the conclusion that
its data was accurate and that the amount of landless workers was correctly recorded.
30 The source of taxpayers is the Anuario Estadístico de España for the respective years.
31 Accordingly, we have found that the recorded amount of land owners was strongly correlated with the
amount and size of municipalities in any given province. The regression of the relative amount of
taxpayers (the amount taxpayers divided by agrarian male working population) on the average agrarian
surface by municipality gives a coefficient of -0.4 with an adjusted R2 of 0.27 and F-test of 16.83. The
number of taxpayers exceeded the amount of rural families in provinces where the number of
municipalities was exceptionally large. Thus, level comparisons across provinces employing that data are
unreliable. However, because we have no reason to think the amount of ownership in different
municipalities varied significantly in different periods, this data could be employed for studying the
evolution of the amount of land owners (which is certainly our variable of interest). It should also be
noted that this problem of the source was relatively unimportant in Southern provinces, which centered
the debate on the agrarian reform. In the provinces below the parallel of Madrid, the large extension of
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employ the amount of taxpayers in each year corrected by this ratio to estimate the amount of
owners and tenants (and the amount of landless workers) for all benchmarks. Finally, the amount
of landless workers is obtained as residual by deleting from the agricultural workforce the
estimated amount of landowners and tenants.32
Appendix 2. Data sources.
Land Price data
Our study uses the information provided by the property register yearbooks (Anuario de la
Dirección General). We used yearly data from 1904, the year that regular publication began, to 1934
when the political upheavals and later the Civil War interrupted the series until the mid-1940s.
Information is grouped by provinces (49),33 and includes the number and total value of farms
registered by reason of sale, inheritance, gift, mortgage and first registration. The source also
distinguishes between urban and rural properties, which are the only considered in this paper. In
other words, we derived from the sources the nominal average price of plots in each province.
To convert these nominal prices into real (base 1910) prices, we used the rural provincial deflator
(see above).
Real Wages
The wage data are drawn from Spanish Yearbooks (Anuario estadístico de España) for the
corresponding years. The quality of the sources is discussed in Rosés and Sánchez-Alonso (2004).
To convert these nominal wages into real (base 1910) prices, we used the rural provincial deflator
(see above).
Rural provincial deflator
The rural cost-of-living deflator has been constructed with data on rural prices from the
corresponding yearbooks of the Instituto de Reformas Sociales. The weight of the different
municipalities and the relatively centralized nature of residential locations made it difficult for owner-
cultivators to have land plots in more than one municipality.
32 It should be noted that many landless workers, and even many small land owners and tenants, also
worked at service and industry jobs for some months of the year (Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, 2009).
Furthermore, they were not attached to a particular farm and moved across provinces and regions,
following job opportunities by the agrarian calendar (Silvestre, 2007).
33 However, we do not consider the Canary Islands in our calculations (this choice reduces our sample to a
maximum of 48 observations per year).
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components of rural cost-of-living deflator and methodology for constructing price indices are
drawn from Rosés and Sánchez-Alonso (2004).
Gross Agricultural Value Added
The gross agricultural value added was computed in the following way. The quantities of
production of different agrarian products collected by GEHR (1991) were multiplied by the
relative prices and the transforming coefficients provided by Simpson (1994). Then, these real
values were converted into nominal values using the disaggregated agrarian prices provided by
Prados de la Escosura (2003). Finally, current prices series were converted to real gross value
added by deflating them using Rosés and Sánchez-Alonso’s rural price consumer index (2009).
Productivity per hectare
This is computed as gross value added divided by cultivated hectares. The source of hectares is
GEHR (1991).
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Table 1. The amount of Owners, Tenants and Landless Workers in Spain, 1860-1930
Panel A: Owners & tenants 1860 1890 1910 1930
Andalusia 429,682 (52.6%) 443,806 (53.1%) 471,652 (52.3%) 537,445 (59.9%)
Ebro Valley 189,440 (44.7%) 232,389 (58.3%) 263,091 (71.0%) 231,145 (75.5%)
Mediterranean 530,590 (61.0%) 578,692 (67.2%) 632,303 (69.0%) 526,747 (73.8%)
North 413,813 (43.2%) 429,006 (37.8%) 529,091 (78.4%) 481,368 (91.4%)
Northern Castile 372,771 (58.8%) 461,162 (76.1%) 434,442 (72.6%) 347,675 (75.8%)
Southern Castile 417,784 (65.3%) 436,231 (62.9%) 439,459 (58.0%) 410,798 (66.4%)
Spain 2,354,080 (54.2%) 2,581,286 (57.0%) 2,770,039 (65.6%) 2,535,179 (72.0%)
Panel B: Landless workers 1860 1890 1910 1930
Andalusia 387,296 (47.4%) 391,977 (46.9%) 429,710 (47.7%) 359,395 (40.1%)
Ebro Valley 234,419 (55.3%) 166,304 (41.7%) 107,609 (29.0%) 75,171 (24.5%)
Mediterranean 339,399 (39.0%) 282,823 (32.8%) 284,539 (31.0%) 187,421 (26.2%)
North 543,092 (56.8%) 707,068 (62.2%) 145,680 (21.6%) 45,543 (8.6%)
Northern Castile 261,413 (41.2%) 144,805 (23.9%) 164,051 (27.4%) 111,057 (24.2%)
Southern Castile 222,417 (34.7%) 257,406 (37.1%) 317,922 (42.0%) 208,295 (33.6%)
Spain 1,988,035 (45.8%) 1,950,383 (43.0%) 1,449,512 (34.4%) 986,881 (28.0%)
Notes: We have grouped the provinces into six macro-regions (following Rosés and Sánchez-Alonso,
2004): Andalusia (Almeria, Cadiz, Cordoba, Granada, Huelva, Jaen, Malaga and Seville), Mediterranean
(Gerona, Barcelona, Tarragona, Castellon, Valencia , Alicante and Murcia), Ebro Valley (Lerida, Saragossa,
Huesca, Teruel, and Logrono), Southern Castile (Caceres, Badajoz, Albacete, Ciudad Real, Cuenca,
Guadalajara, Madrid, Toledo), Northern Castile (Salamanca, Zamora, Leon, Valladolid, Palencia, Burgos,
Soria, Segovia) and North (Corunna, Pontevedra, Lugo, Orense, Asturias, Santander).
Sources: see Appendix 1.
Table 2. Between and Within-Province Breakdown of Changes in the Share of Landless workers in
Agrarian Employment, 1860-1930
1860-1890 1890-1910 1910-1930 1860-1930
Overall -0.0915 -0.4343 -0.3166 -0.2538
Between component 0.0418 -0.0132 0.0125 0.0032
Within component -0.1333 -0.4212 -0.3291 -0.2570
Cross-classified by region
Andalucía -0.0014 0.0123 -0.0854 -0.0198
Ebro Valley -0.0391 -0.0541 -0.0162 -0.0380
Mediterranean -0.0465 -0.0176 -0.0383 -0.0349
North 0.0271 -0.4134 -0.0889 -0.1235
Northern Castile -0.0844 0.0215 -0.0198 -0.0342
Southern Castile 0.0109 0.0301 -0.0804 -0.0067
Notes: see Table 1.
Sources: see Appendix 1.
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Table 3. The reallocation from Landless Workers to Owners and Tenants in Spain, 1860-1930
1860-1890 1890-1910 1910-1930 1860-1930
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Andalusia 4,234 (1.09%) -6,977 (-1.78%) 68,159 (15.86%) 65,760 (16.98%)
Ebro Valley 54,197 (23.12%) 47,018 (28.27%) 13,748 (12.78%) 94,240 (40.20%)
Mediterranean 53,270 (15.70%) 16,447 (5.82%) 34,219 (12.03%) 91,189 (26.87%)
North -62,289 (-11.47%) 274,283 (38.79%) 68,215 (46.83%) 253,506 (46.68%)
Northern Castile 104,977 (40.16%) -21,032 (-14.52%) 14,685 (8.95%) 78,034 (29.85%)
Southern Castile -16,424 (-7.38%) -36,861 (-14.32%) 51,579 (16.22%) 6,789 (3.05%)
Spain 124,439 (6.26%) 366,539 (18.79%) 223,027 (15.39%) 625,692 (31.47%)
Notes: (1) Quantity of landless workers reallocated to owners and tenants; (2) Percent of landless workers
reallocated to owners and tenants (workers reallocated divided by landless workers at T-1). See table 1.
Sources: see Appendix 1.
Table 4. The Access to Land in Spain: Regional Differences, 1908-1931
Average
Price
per
plot
Average
Price
per
hectare
Average
days per
plot
Average
days
Per
hectare
Average
years per
plot
Average
years
Per
hectare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Andalusia 1,896.4 377.7 802 153 2.88 0.55
Ebro Valley 873.0 473.7 249 165 0.86 0.57
Mediterranean 1,341.4 767.2 459 255 1.64 0.91
North 1,162.9 1,095.1 780 858 2.66 2.86
Northern Castile 481.7 422.6 286 326 0.91 1.04
Southern Castile 1,229.0 234.1 506 121 1.73 0.42
Spain 1,167.8 434.4 514 316 1.78 1.07
Notes: See text.
Sources: See Appendix 2.
Table 5. Abandoning labor markets: Regional Differences, 1908-1931
1908-1920 1921-1931 1908-1931
(1) (2) (3)
Andalusia 1.263 1.335 1.296
Ebro Valley 1.454 1.753 1.591
Mediterranean 2.083 1.798 1.952
North 3.415 3.663 3.529
Northern Castile 1.527 2.132 1.805
Southern Castile 1.178 1.337 1.251
Spain 1.899 1.894 1.899
Notes: In years of family work. Unweighted provincial average. See text.
Sources: See Appendix 2.
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Figure 1. Demand and Supply Shifts in Agrarian Labor Markets
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Figure 3. The ratio between Value Added per hectare and wages in Spain, 1904-1931
(average 1908-12 = 100).
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Notes: see text.
Sources: see Appendix 2.
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Figure 2. Demand Shifts in Agrarian Land Markets
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Figure 4. The ratio between land prices per hectare and wages in Spain, 1904-1931
(average 1908-12 = 100)
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Notes: see text.
Sources: see Appendix 2.
Figure 5. Access to land: Average male days of work necessary for buying the mean plot,
1908-1931 (unweighted provincial
average).
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Notes: see text.
Sources: see Appendix 2.
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Figure 6. Access to land (Ebro valley, North and Northern Castile): Average male days of work
necessary for buying the mean plot, 1908-1931 (unweighted provincial average).
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Notes: see text.
Sources: see Appendix 2.
Figure 7. Access to land (Andalusia, Mediterranean and Soththern Castile): Average male days of
work necessary for buying the mean plot, 1908-1931 (unweighted provincial average).
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Notes: see text.
Sources: see Appendix 2.
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Figure 8. Access to land: Estimates average years of family work necessary for buying the mean
plot, 1908-1931 (unweighted provincial average).
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Notes: see text.
Sources: see Appendix 2.
